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Chapter 7

Funding of Defined Benefit
Pension Plans
Mark J. Warshawsky

Funding of defined benefit pension plans has long been an important
topic to financial analysts and government policymakers. Knowing the
funded status of sponsored plans is often an essential part of knowing
the financial health of a corporate sponsor. Similarly, the funded status
of plans is relevant to the financial prospects of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and to the necessary level of tax expenditures for the private pension system.
This chapter has three specific goals: (1) to explain fully the evolution
of the complex minimum funding requirements imposed by the federal
government on plan sponsors by highlighting three legislative eras;
(2) to give a short history of financial accounting standards for pension
sponsors, focusing on the current regime of measurement, recognition,
and disclosure; and (3) to present statistics on funding from plan sponsors' financial statements. This chapter also discusses the broad motivations of government and accounting policymakers in adopting various
rules, as well as the impact of these rules on the current and future funding of private defined benefit plans in the United States. Finally, a simple
set of minimum funding requirements and maximum limits, akin to financial accounting standards, is recommended here to partially replace
the complex requirements currently in place.

Defined Benefit Plans, Funding, and the PBGe
There are two main categories of qualified retirement plans offered in
the United States, defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC)
plans. In a DB plan, the employer promises to pay the worker a specified
retirement benefit that generally increases with each additional year of
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work. In a DC plan, the employer, and sometimes the worker, contributes an amount of money every year into the worker's account, available,
with accrued investment earnings, upon retirement. Although DC plans,
particularly 401 (k) plans, expanded greatly during the 1980s as both primary and secondary plans, DB plans still provide most of the retirement
benefit coverage to workers at large private and public employers.
In order to provide the benefits, the DB plan sponsor must have assets
on hand when workers retire and benefit payments start. If the sponsor
were to default on its obligation and did not set aside enough assets,
retirees and workers will have lost hard-earned benefits important to
their financial security. Despite generous tax incentives adequately to
fund their pension obligations, through the 1960s some private employers defaulted without sufficient pension assets, and retirees and workers
lost promised benefits.
With the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1974, Congress established minimum funding requirements
and a federal government agency-the PBGC-to insure retirement
benefits, up to a maximum level, earned through most private DB plans.
When compliance with the minimum funding requirements is poor, or
the requirements themselves are either inadequate or incomplete, a terminating plan sponsor in distress will probably have insufficient assets to
fund its plan. In such cases, the PBGC will step in and pay the promised,
but unfunded, benefits.
Through the 1980s, the financial situation of the PBGC worsened considerably. Successive legislative actions in the mid-1980s to tighten minimum funding requirements and raise premiums charged by the PBGC
apparently did lead to some stabilization of PBGC finances. Nevertheless, concerns about the PBGC in the media, Congress, the administration, and among plan participan ts con tinued to mount in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. One measure of the risk exposure of the PBGC-the
liabilities less assets of underfunded plans-began to increase after several years of decline, and projections indicated that the long-term financial health of the PBGC was in jeopardy. The 1990-1991 recession
weakened some plan sponsors and caused the value of some assets held
by plan sponsors, particularly real estate, to fall. Moreover, during this
time there have been very few new DB plans, and numerous DB plan
terminations, thus lowering the premium base of the PBGC.

Actuarial Valuations
The funded status of a DB pension plan is determined by comparing the
plan's assets with its liabilities. Assets are generally measured at market
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value. The liabilities are measured as the actuarial present value of the
plan's benefits. Such a valuation reflects the probability that the various
benefits will become payable and the discounting effect of the time value
of money. Therefore, among the important actuarial assumptions involved in a valuation are rate of investment earnings, mortality, retirement, future salary increases, and employee turnover.
The purpose of the valuation can influence the calculation of liability
by changing the relative importance of the various actuarial assumptions
or even in some cases by changing the actuary's best estimate of a particular actuarial assumption. For example, in a forecast valuation, the
open group technique is used, that is, it is assumed that the plan sponsor
will hire additional workers in the future. Moreover, other actuarial assumptions reflect the plan as an on-going entity. By contrast, in a termination valuation, the closed group technique is used. Moreover, in
such a valuation, there will be no assumption necessary concerning future salary increases, and the relevant interest rate and mortality tables
should reflect the cost of annuitizing benefits.
In practical terms, the most important valuations are those mandated
by federal law (ERISA) for purposes of determining a plan's minimum
funding requirements and those mandated by generally accepted accounting principles for purposes of the recognition and disclosure of
pension expense in the financial statements of the plan sponsor. Neither
type of valuations allows an open group technique. Beyond this consideration, however, these valuations employ different blends of ongoing
versus termination assumptions. Indeed, as will be explained in detail
below, the funding requirements and financial accounting standards
over time have increased the relative weight given conceptually to the
likelihood that the plan will terminate.

The Evolution of Funding Requirements
Federal law requires that defined benefit plans sponsored by private employers be funded before benefi ts are due to be paid to plan participants. In particular, contributions of cash or, within strict limits, other
employer securities must be made within a range specified in the law.
The evolutionary history of these requirements can be divided into three
distinct periods: first, that of the original ERISA rules; second, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987 was enacted; and finally, the
Retirement Protection ACT (RPA) of 1994 was passed. As will be shown,
the scope of plan sponsor discretion in funding has been narrowed over
time and the consideration given to termination has become more
prominent.
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ERISA's Original Minimum Funding Requirements
In the years prior to the passage of ERISA, thousands of DB pension
plans, mostly small and only in operation for a few years, terminated with
some loss of benefits to participants. The failure in 1962 of the Studebaker plan, a large plan with sizable losses to many participants, however,
particularly focused attention on plan benefit security. In order to protect participants against losses and to make feasible the federal pension
insurance programs administered by the PBGC, Congress, when passing
ERISA in 1974, added section 412 to the Internal Revenue Code to require minimum funding.
Under section 412, a funding standard account is set up to determine
a DB plan's minimum funding requirement for a plan year. The requirement is the net sum of charges and credits, including (I) a normal cost
charge, (2) any funding deficiency charge (or credit balance) carried
over from the prior year, (3) an amortization charge for the initial
unfunded accrued liability, (4) amortization charges (or credits) for increases (or decreases) in liabilities owing to plan amendments, (5) amortization charges (or credits) due to experience losses (or gains), and
(6) amortization charges (or credits) for losses (or gains) resulting from
changes in actuarial assumptions.
Excise taxes are imposed on the funding deficiency ofa plan until the
minimum required contribution is made. For plans unable to meet the
minimum funding requirement because of the substantial business hardship of the plan sponsor, ERISA provided that a waiver of the requirement could be requested. If the IRS granted the request (subject to the
satisfaction of certain conditions on the plan), the amount waived became a charge base to be amortized over the next IS years in the funding
standard account. If the request were denied and the plan sponsor failed
to make the required contribution, excise taxes would be levied on the
funding deficiency until the contribution is made.
ERISA listed six actuarial cost methods as acceptable for calculating
normal costs and accrued liabilities. Each cost method has a unique way
of calculating normal cost, related either to the actual accrual of benefits
(unit credit method) or to the projected costs funded in the form oflevel
annual payments. The accrued liability is defined as the present value of
future benefits minus the present value of future normal costs; for the
same plan and participant groups, the accrued liability differs depending
on the cost method chosen. The unfunded liability is that part of the
accrued liability in excess of assets. A plan can have an initial unfunded
accrued liability if, when it is created, benefits are given based on the
past service of current workers.
Gains and losses result from changes in actuarial assumptions and/or
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are the differences between the actual experiences of the plan and those
expected in accordance with the actuarial assumptions. Depending on
the cost method, experience gains and losses are amortized either over
15 years (as originally enacted in ERISA) (immediate gain methods) or
as part of the normal cost (spread gain methods). ERISA also required
that the actuarial assumptions used in detennining plan costs be reasonable in the aggregate. I
For determining the minimum funding requirement, the amortization bases giving rise to the amortization charges and credits in the funding standard account are amortized over a specified number of years
generally at the valuation interest rate. ERISA provided that the initial
unfunded past service accrued liability be amortized over forty years for
plans already in existence on January 1, 1974, and over thirty years for
plans formed afterJanuary 1,1974. If a plan is amended and the amendment results in a change in the unfunded accrued liability, such change
is amortized over thirty years. (Most amendments increase benefits, and
hence result in charges.) As originally enacted in ERISA, gains or losses
resulting from changes in actuarial assumptions were also amortized
over 30 years and, as already indicated, experience gains and losses and
waivers were amortized over 15 years."
The funding requirement is capped by the full-funding limitation.
The limitation is the sum of the accrued liability and normal cost (both
brought to the end of the year with interest) minus the lesser of the fair
market value or actuarial (smoothed) value of plan assets (also brought
to the end of the year with interest). The assets are also decreased for
any credit balances in the funding standard account. When a plan has a
funding requirement in excess of the full-funding limitation, a credit is
given in the funding standard account for the amount of the excess, and
all amortization bases are considered fully amortized.

Scope of Allowable Discretion Under Original ERISA
ERISA allowed implicitly for a range of funding levels in pension plans.
It is possible for a plan to satisfY the minimum funding requirements and
yet be underfunded if the plan should terminate. Alternatively, a plan
may be well funded on a termination basis and still have a substantial
required contribution for the plan year under section 412. Under original ERISA, the plan sponsor had considerable discretion to choose the
funding scenario it desired.
The plan sponsor is allowed a choice of funding methods and, furthermore, is allowed, subject to IRS requirements, to switch funding methods.' Some methods amortize past service liabilities over 30 years, while
other methods fund these liabilities over the average working lifetime of
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plan participants. In most plans, average working lifetime is shorter than
thirty years; therefore, choosing a method that amortizes past service liability over thirty years reduces the rate at which the plan accumulates
assets.
Among immediate gain methods, for the same group of employees
and in a plan where benefits accrue ratably to retirement age, annual
plan costs under the unit credit funding method are lower in earlier
years and higher in later years than those under the entry age normal
method. Even with the entry age normal method, a level dollar approach
will fund more quickly in early years than a level percent of pay approach when contributions increase as overall participant compensation
increases'
There are two other sources of variability in funding status within the
context of sponsor choice within the funding rules. First, subject to
the full funding limitation, plan sponsors could contribute on a taxdeductible basis by amortizing unfunded accrued liabilities over no
fewer than ten years. Second, it has been alleged that actuarial assumptions were sometimes manipulated to effect smaller or larger contributions, notwithstanding the requirement that the actuary use assumptions
reflecting his or her best estimate of anticipated experience.
Despite the wide discretion given plan sponsors, there are certain correlations of funding levels with plan types in which the funding rules
seem to play an important role. A plan with a flat dollar formula provides
a specified dollar amount for each year of service. In order for this plan
to provide a benefit equivalent to a consistent percentage of compensation, the flat dollar benefit must be increased periodically to keep pace
\vith inflation and compensation increases. The plan cannot fund for
these increases before the plan amendment is negotiated but, under
most funding methods, instead funds the resulting increases as unfunded liabilities over 30 years. This problem generally does not exist in
a plan which bases benefits on compensation because funding for such
plans is required to be based upon the projected benefits at retirement,
including expected increased compensation.

OBRA '87 Minimum Funding Requirements
When ERlSA was passed, plan sponsors had quite a bit oflatitude in their
funding decisions before they approached ei ther the Scylla of exceeding
maximum allowable contributions or the Charybdis of failing the minimum funding requirements. To a large extent, this latitude was the intent of Congress in order to encourage the formation of DB plans and
the granting of new benefits. If the funding decision was too narrowly
circumscribed, existing plan sponsors would lack flexibility and could
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even be forced into bankruptcy or other forms of financial distress. Of
course, the PBGC was left exposed, but it was probably hoped at the time
that the PBGC would confront minimal plan failures.
The experience of the 1980s, however, forced changes. Some small DB
plans sponsored by highly paid professionals were claiming very large
income tax deductions. At the same time, losses at the PBGC were
mounting as certain industries declined and some large plan sponsors
failed, leaving large unfunded pension liabilities. Congress responded
in 1987 with a tightening of limitations on deductions and attempts to
strengthen the minimum funding requirements. In 1987 and again in
1989, Congress raised the premiums DB plan sponsors paid to the PBGC.
The most important concept introduced by OBRA '87 was the "current liability." It is the sum of the present values of accrued benefits for
each participan t, calculated as if the plan purchased annuities for these
benefits, using an interest rate within a permissible range of rates. The
permissible range is defined as an interest rate not more than 10 percent
above or below the weighted average of the thirty-year Treasury bond
yields for the preceding four-year period. Current liability is therefore
determined independently of the actuarial cost method of the plan and
is related to the termination liability.5
OBRA '87 uses this concept to establish the "current liability full funding limitation," which prevails if it is less than the old limitation based
on the accrued liability. The new limitation equals 150 percent of the
current liability plus the expected increase in current liability due to
benefits accruing during the year (brought to the end of year with interest, using the current liability interest rate) minus the lesser of the fair
market value or the actuarial value of assets (also brought forward with
interest)." When the new limitation applies and the plan has a funding
deficiency (prior to contributions) in excess of this limitation, a ten-year
amortization charge base is established for the amount which would
have been a required contribution except for application of the new
limitation.
The lower current liability limitation can make funding less smooth
over time due to the deferred amortization payments, particularly for
plans using funding methods other than unit credit. The new limitation
also may defer funding for a compensation-based plan covering relatively young employees. In particular, the accrued liability (even when
calculated using the projected unit credit method) for a new group
would reflect a significant amount of benefits based on projections of
increased future compensation; 150 percent of the current liability
(wherein such increases cannot be anticipated) may be less than the accrued liability. Schieber and Shoven (1994) claim that this limitation as
well as other legislative and regulatory changes of the 1980s and 1990s
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will lead to a delay in the funding of the baby boom generation's defined
benefit plans. It is unclear, however, how the fact that a smaller percentage of the baby boom generation is covered by the private DB plan system than in the prior generation is included in their model.
OBRA '87 u"ied to improve funding in underfunded plans as well as
to limit overfunding. It provided that the deductible limit for nonmultiemployer plans with more than 100 participants would not be less
than the plan's unfunded current liability. For all DB plans other than
multiemployer plans, OBRA '87 required that a plan's minimum funding
requirement be paid in quarterly installments, rather than the previously
permitted situation where sponsors could delay contributions until 8\--2
months after the end of the plan year. 7
OBRA '87 also shortened the length of several of the amortization
periods used in determining a non-multiemployer plan's minimum funding requirement. Experience gains and losses arising in plan years after
1987 are amortized over five years, gains and losses arising from changes
in actuarial assumptions are amortized over 10 years, and funding waivers granted after 1987 are amortized over five years. The interest rate
applied to the amortization of the waiver is related to current market
rates rather than the valuation interest rate. The conditions for granting
waivers were also tightened. s
OBRA '87 did not shorten the amortization periods for initial liability
created on the granting of past service credit in a new plan or for increases in liability due to benefit increases. Rather, it introduced an additional funding scheme in new section 412(1) to reduce underfunding
in addition to the old ERISA minimum funding rules. This scheme-the
additional funding charge-applies only to single-employer plans with
100 or more participants and whose current liability exceeds the value of
assets reduced by any credit balance in the funding standard account.
The additional funding charge equals the "deficit reduction contribution" (DRC) offset by certain amortization payments.
The DRC equals the unfunded old liability amount plus the unfunded
new liability amount. The unfunded old liability is the current liability
less the actuarial value of assets reduced by the credit balance as of the
1988 plan year. (Plans formed after 1988 have no old liability.) The unfunded old liability amount is the payment amortizing the unfunded old
liability over 18 years beginning in 1989. The unfunded new liability is
the unfunded cun-ent liability in the cun-ent plan year less the outstanding balance of the unfunded old liability. The unfunded new liability amount is the "applicable percentage" of the unfunded new
liability. The applicable percentage is 30 percent if the funded current
liability percentage is less than 35 percent; it decreases by .25 of one percentage point for each percentage point by which the plan's funded cur-
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rent liability percentage exceeds 35 percent. An applicable percentage
of 30 percent is equivalent to an amortization period of about four years.
To arrive at the additional funding charge, the DRC was reduced by
the net of amortization charges and credits for the initial unfunded liability, waivers, and increases and decreases in the unfunded liability due
to amendments. Because these offsets to the DRC did not include amortization charges and credits for changes in actuarial assumptions or experience losses and gains, it was entirely possible for an underfunded
plan to have no additional funding charge. In particular, old flat dollar
benefit plans which started funding under ERISA with low interest rate
assumptions (resulting in large amortization charges) would have a large
offset to the DRC. In addition, if the plans increased their interest rate
assumptions in the 1980s, they would have large credits in their funding
standard accounts. By contrast, newer plans established with high interest rate assumptions which then lowered their assumptions would experience the contribution burden in extra measure.

RPA '94 Minimum Funding Requirements
Although the immediate financial situation of the PBGC had not
changed much since the passage of OBRA '87, there were indications
that the underfunding of plans was a growing problem. Following intense scrutiny of the FSLIC-savings-and-Ioan debacle and the resulting
review of other government-sponsored insurance programs, Congress,
in the RPA, significantly altered the minimum funding rules. These
changes were passed in December 1994 as part of the legislation implementing GATT and are generally effective beginning in the 1995
plan year.
The RPA makes three important changes to the formulas used to calculate the DRC and the additional funding charge. First, the applicable
percentage of 30 percent for calculating the unfunded new liability
amount now holds if a plan's funded current liability percentage is less
than 60 percent (rather than 35 percent as before). The applicable percentage decreases by.40 ofa percentage point for each percentage point
by which the funded current liability percentage exceeds 60 percent, to
a minimum of 18 percent for a plan that is 90 percent funded. For example, a plan which is 70 percent funded would now have an applicable
percentage of26 percent rather than 21.25 percent, as under OBRA '87.
Second, the DRC now includes as a component the expected increase in
current liability due to benefits accruing during the plan year. Third, all
amortization charges and credits are now included as offsets to the DRC
in computing the additional funding charge, including experience gains
or losses, changes in liabilities due to changes in actuarial cost methods,
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and gains and losses due to changes in actuarial assumptions. Thus, the
minimum required contribution for underfunded plans, in general, is
the greater of the amount determined under the normal funding rules
or the DRC.
The RPA gradually narrows the interest rate corridor used to calculate
current liability for purposes of the DRC and specifies a mortality assumption. More specifically, for the 1999 plan year and beyond, the
maximum interest rate used to calculate current liability is 105 percent
of the weighted four-year moving average yield on 30-year Treasury
bonds. Until then, the maximum is reduced by 1 percent per year from
110 percent, that is, the maximum is 109 percent in 1995, 108 percent in
1996, and so on. For the 1995 plan year, the mortality table used to determine current liability (to be prescribed by the Secretary of Treasury)
will be based on the 1983 Group Annuity Mortality (GAM) Table." The
underlying logic of this requirement is that, in recent years, when pricing
group annuities for terminating pension plans, life insurers typically use
the 1983 GAM table.
The combined impact of these changes in the minimum funding rules
probably would have increased substan tially the required contributions
of many plans, especially compared to the very low level of additional
contributions induced by section 412(1) introduced in OBRA. Furthermore, the required changes in actuarial assumptions would have drawn
in plans heretofore un touched by the special funding rules for underfunded plans. 'o Hence, Congress designed numerous permanent and
transitional items in the RPA that exempt some plans from the strengthened funding rules and limit the immediate impact of the rules.
There are two permanent exemptions from the additional funding
charge for underfunded plans. First, the charge will not apply for a plan
year if the plan has a "funded current liability percentage" of90 percent
or greater. Second, the charge does not apply for a plan year if (1) the
plan's funded current liability percentage is at least 80 percent, and
(2) the plan had been 90 percent or better funded for any two consecutive years of the previous three plan years. For purposes of these
thresholds, the funded current liability percentage is calculated using
the highest allowable interest rate, and assets are not reduced by credit
balances.
There are also two transition rules exempting plans in near years. The
first rule is that a plan is exempt from the additional funding charge in
the 1995 and 1996 plan years if the plan's funded current liability percentage is at least 80 percent and the plan meets one of three special
tests in each of any two of the 1992, 1993, or 1994 plan years. I I The second transition rule is that a plan is exempt from the additional funding
charge in the 1996 and 1997 plan years if (1) the plan's funded current
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liability percentage is at least 80 percent, (2) the plan's funded percentage was at least 90 percent in 1995, and (3) the plan met one of the
special tests in 1994.
The net effect of these permanent and transitional exemptions is
probably to remove most plans with a funded percentage of at least
80 percent in the 1995 and 1996 plan years from the application of the
sU'engthened additional funding charge. Some, but progressively fewer,
80 percent-funded plans will be exempted in the 1997 plan year and
beyond.
For those plans not exempted from the additional funding charge, the
charge is limited into the next century under various other transition
rules. The RPA permits a plan to amortize over twelve years the increase
in current liability in 1995 due to the mandated interest rate and mortality table (as compared to the relative interest rate and mortality table
actually used in the 1993 plan year). This amortization is called the "additional unfunded old liability amount." Alternatively, the plan sponsor
can make an irrevocable election to amortize over twelve years the entire unfunded post-1987 increase in current liability. If this alternative is
chosen, however, the additional funding charge cannot be less than if
the OBRA '87 version of the law remained in effect. This election may
prove to be popular with many severely underfunded plans.
For plan years 1995 to 2001, the RPA limits the additional funding
charge, at the option of the plan sponsor in any year, to the amount
necessary to achieve certain funding ratio targets. 12 Under this optional
rule, however, the additional funding charge must be at least that required under OBRA '87.
In its 1987 Annual Report, the PBGC stated the following: "Companies such as Allis-Chalmers Corporation terminated plans with large liabilities but virtually no assets, yet the companies had satisfied the existing
minimum funding requirements" (PBGC, 1987: 4). In response to these
situations, the RPA added a solvency requirement to minimum funding
as a third independent element. This requirement applies to non-multiemployer plans less than 100 percent funded for current liability, and
requires these plans to maintain cash, marketable securities, or other
liquid assets equal to three years' worth of disbursements, generally calculated based on payments made from the plan during the prior 12
months. If the necessary assets are not maintained in any quarter, either
additional contributions must be made to achieve the necessary level or
excise taxes are imposed and the plan is prohibited from making payments (such as lump-sum or annuity purchases) to participants in excess
of the amount payable as a single life annuity."
The PBGC justified the complexity of its initial legislative proposal by
stating that it was carefully crafted to reach only problem areas. The final
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funding requirements passed as RPA became even more complex as a
result of the political legislative process. The question remains, however, whether essentially the same goals and expected outcomes could
have been accomplished in a much less complex manner. Complexity,
of course, translates into large administrative burdens, particularly for
small- and medium-size plans.

Financial Accounting Standards for Pension
Obligations of Single-Employer Plan Sponsors
The link between the funding status of plans and financial accounting
standards for pensions can never be as direct as the link of funding status
with the minimum funding requirements for contributions. The former
reflects accounting transactions, while the latter represents requirements for actual cash outlays. Moreover, initially financial standards
were quite amorphous, and then were changed to match the range of
actuarial funding practice eventually refined and reflected in the original version of ERISA. More recently, however, financial accounting
standards for pensions have been standardized and may serve as an influence, independent of the funding requirements, on the funding decisions of plan sponsors. Unlike the evolution of funding requirements,
where older conceptual elements coexist with newer ones, the history of
accounting standards is more revolutionary, being characterized by the
disappearance of past conceptual structures.
The financial statements of plan sponsors (including income statements, balance sheets, and accompanying notes) are examined intensively by financial analysts on behalf of investors and creditors for a view
of the overall long-term profitability of the company as well as for any
signs of financial weakness. Through their influence on the flow of investment funds to plan sponsors, it is likely that financial accounting
standards also have an influence on the funding decisions of plan sponsors. In particular, these standards may provide a cynosure for financial
analysts, in turn establishing a funding goal for the community of plan
sponsors.

Accounting Standards Under ARB No. 47,
APB No.8, and FAS No. 36
Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 47 was issued in 1956 and
called simply for pension costs to be spread over the current and future service of employees in a systematic and rational manner. It was discovered, however, that under ARB No. 47 there were wide ranges in

Mark J. Warshawsky

11 9

amortization periods, and past and prior service costs were sometimes
charged to retained earnings instead of current income. i4 Other problems included lower pension expense being recorded when profits were
low, and instances of pay-as-you-go and terminal accounting.'5
The accounting treatment of pension costs was stabilized somewhat
when the Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued Opinion No.8 in
1966; the opinion was operative until 1987. Annual charges of pension
expense to current income were required regardless of actual funding
practices. Despite a desire for standardization, however, APB o. 8 only
specified minimum and maximum allowable pension cost accruals. i6 It
allowed the charge to expense to be based on reasonable actuarial assumptions and any reasonable actuarial cost method (other than payas-you-go and terminal accounting) chosen by the plan sponsor. The
methods eventually allowed by ERISA were allowed by APB No.8.
Because the minimum and maximum charges, with few exceptions,
bracketed the contributions allowed by ERISA, pension expense for accounting purposes usually equaled actual contributions to the plan. If,
however, contributions to a plan during a given year were less than
pension expense, the difference was a liability for accrued pension cost
shown on the balance sheet. If contributions exceeded pension expense,
an asset for prepaid pension cost was established. A required disclosure
was the unfunded vested benefit.
In 1980, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued
Statement No. 36 requiring additional disclosures by plan sponsors. In
particular, Financial Accounting Statement (FAS) No. 36 required that
the notes to the financial statement include listing the vested and nonvested accumulated plan benefit obligations (and the interest rate used
to determine them) and net assets available for benefits. The accumulated benefit obligation is essentially the accrued liability calculated under the traditional unit credit method, that is, without salary projections.
All plans of the employer could be aggregated. No other changes were
made to APB No.8 until an entirely different accounting approach was
promulgated in 1985.

Accounting Standards Under FAS No. 87
Beginning in 1987 (earlier application was encouraged), new accounting standards for the recognition of pension expense and the disclosure
of funding status by plan sponsors were required by the FASB. Statement
No. 87 reduced considerably the discretion of plan sponsors in their accounting choices for pensions and, moreover, completely broke the link
with federal funding requirements. As will be explained below, FAS
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No. 87 reflects at least two views of the economic exchange between plan
sponsors and employees: termination and on-going plan views. (See also
DeBerg, Mittelstaedt, and Regier 1987.) FAS No. 87 does consistently
reflect the principle, however, that amortizations should occur over the
remaining service lifetimes of active plan participants, rather than arbitrary fixed periods.

Pension Expense
Under FAS No. 87, pension expense is generally not materially different from "net periodic pension cost." Such cost is the combination of
the following six components: (1) service cost, (2) interest cost, (3) actual return on plan assets, (4) amortization of unrecognized prior service
cost, (5) gain or loss to the extent recognized, and (6) amortization of
unrecognized net transition obligation (asset). Certain components will
be positive, and others usually negative; the sum will usually be positive.
Each component will now be explained in turn.
Service cost is the normal cost calculated under the projected unit
credit method for compensation-based plans and under the traditional
unit credit method for flat-dollar plans. No other actuarial cost methods are allowed. Generally, therefore, the cost for the year for a compensation-based plan would be the actuarial present value of the
participants' anticipated benefits attributed to that year of service. By
using projected benefits, FAS No. 87 reflects the ongoing plan view,
whereby it is assumed that the plan will continue in existence beyond
the year, and, therefore, the plan sponsor's obligations will generally be
greater than if the plan were to terminate in the current year.
The interest assumption used to calculate service cost (and pension
benefit obligations) must reflect the rates at which the pension benefits
could be effectively settled. These discount rates can be based on yields
on high-quality bonds or those implicit in group annuity contracts. (In
September 1993, the SEC stated that high-quality bonds are those receiving one of the two highest ratings given by a recognized rating agency.)
This requirement reflects the termination view, whereby it is assumed
that the plan can be terminated immediately and that the termination
liability represents the sum total of the sponsor's obligation. All other
actuarial assumptions must be individually reasonable and chosen on the
premise that the plan will continue into the future.
Interest cost is the amount by which the projected benefit obligation
(the accrued liability calculated under the projected unit credit method)
is expected to grow during the year because of interest. The actual return
on assets is investment income for the year, including realized and unrealized depreciation and appreciation of assets. The return component
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is subtracted from expense; if the return on assets has been positive for
the year, pension expense is reduced.
Amortization of unrecognized prior service cost is the amortization of
the unfunded initial accrued liability for a new plan and of the increase
in accrued liability due to plan amendments, both adopted after the implementation of FAS No. 87. The amortization period is the expected
future period of service of active plan participants.
Gain or loss to the extent recognized is a change in the amount of the
projected benefit obligation or plan assets resulting from experience different from that expected or from changes in assumptions. It is negative
if a gain, and positive if a loss. It includes two main subcomponents: the
difference between the actual return on plan assets and the expected
return on plan assets, and amortization of the unrecognized net gain or
loss from previous periods. The expected return on plan assets is based
on the expected long-term rate of return (potentially different from the
discount rate) and the market-related (actuarial) value of plan assets.
The first subcomponent essentially neutralizes which the volatility would
have been induced by the second component of plan expense-the actual return on assets. Amortization of unrecognized net gain or loss (excluding asset gains and losses not yet reflected in market-related value)
from previous periods occurs at a minimum rate of one divided by the
average remaining service life of active participants. I?
The sixth component of expense is the amortization of the excess of
the projected benefit obligation over the market value of assets (at the
date of adoption of FAS No. 87) plus previously recognized unfunded
accrued pension cost or less previously recognized prepaid pension cost.
The amortization period of the net obligation (loss) or the net asset
(gain) is the average remaining service period of employees; if this period is less than fifteen years, the plan sponsor may choose fifteen years.

Recognition and Disclosure ofLiabilities and Assets
Like APB No.8, FAS No. 87 requires the recognition in the balance
sheet of unfunded accrued pension cost or prepaid pension cost. If the
accumulated benefit obligation exceeds the market value of assets, FAS
No. 87 requires the recognition of a liability (including unfunded accrued pension cost) that at least equals the unfunded accumulated benefit obligation. This is called the "additional minimum liability." 18
Required disclosures under FAS No. 87 include the amount of net periodic pension cost showing separately the service cost, interest cost, actual return on assets, and net total of the other components. Also FAS
No. 87 requires separate disclosure for underfunded and overfunded
plans (where funded status is defined on basis of the accumulated bene-
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fit obligation) of the market value of assets and the projected benefit
obligations, also identifying the vested and non-vested accumulated
benefit obligations.

A Comparison with Minimum Funding Requirements
The FASB engendered much controversy when it first proposed an
accounting standard for pensions like FAS No. 87. Discretion was taken
away from accountants and actuaries, and the link to the funding requirements was being broken; two entirely different actuarial valuations
would now need be done. Although the funding requirements themselves were changed at the same time (and continue to change) to limit
discretion, the new accounting standard has come to be viewed as a success and no changes are contemplated. Unlike the current funding
requirements, which result from layer after layer of legislative and regulatory changes, the current financial accounting standard represents a
fairly consistent logical construct. In addition, by standardizing the actuarial cost method, by limiting somewhat the choice of actuarial assumptions, and by tying most amortization periods to the expected
remaining service life of active participants, the accounting standard has
succeeded in making possible the reporting and comparative analysis of
the funded status and expense of DB plans on a realistic economic basis.
Indeed, as will be proposed at the end of this chapter, the accounting
standard represents a good model for a reform of the minimum funding
requirements.

Statistics on the Current Funded Status of Plans
Two primary sources of information on the funded status of defined
benefit pension plans are the pension notes to the financial statements
of sponsors of (single-employer) plans, as required to be reported under
FAS No. 87, and the Schedule B (Actuarial Information) of the Form
5500 filed with the IRS and Department of Labor. Databases from these
two sources, representing nearly all private large DB plans, were collected, edited, and analyzed for statistical evidence on funded status and
analysis of the impact of the funding requirements. The results are presented below.

FAS No. 87 Database r 1987 -93)
The database came in a fairly uniform manner for corporate fiscal years
1987 through 1993 from Standard and Poor's Compustat Services and
includes information about the general, financial, and pension charac-
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teristics of single-employer DB plan sponsors who filed annual financial
statements with the SEC (generally those whose equity was traded on
the national stock exchanges). The Compustat computer data files for
the fiscal years 1987 through 1993 were searched for United Statesdomiciled companies reporting, under the framework ofFAS No. 87, the
sponsorship of one or more DB pension plans. Companies filing annual
statements in 1992 and 1993, and companies currently bankrupt or
merged but filing annual statements in prior years, were included in the
search. Subsidiary companies, even if they filed their own annual statements, however, were excluded. Because FAS No. 87 requires separate
reporting of underfunded and overfunded plans, but otherwise allows
the combination of all plans sponsored by a corporation, information on
funding status on a group basis for each plan sponsor is available from
the FAS No. 87 database. In contrast, information on the funded status
of individual single-employer plans, any multiemployer plans, or any
plans sponsored by privately held companies is only available from the
Schedule B databases.
As shown in Table 1, the number of corporate sponsors with underfunded plans rose over the period 1987 through 1993, the number of
sponsors with overfunded plans declined, and the number of sponsors
with defined benefit plans declined slightly. These results should be caveated, however, because it is likely that for the 1987 year, as defined by
Compustat, some plan sponsors still had not adopted FAS No. 87. The
large increase in the number of underfunded plans from 1992 to 1993

TABLE 1

Number of Corporate Sponsors of Defined Benefit Plans: All Funded
Statuses, with Underfunded, and with Overfunded Plans

Year

All Funded
Statuses

With
Underfunded
Plans

With
Overfunded
Plans

1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987

1,781
1,752
1,814
1,788
1,848
1,892
1,767

755
589
603
651
599
593
531

1,416
1,517
1,602
1,544
1,627
1,681
1,573

Source: See text. Author's computations from Compustat data only include those United
States-domiciled corporations reporting under FAS No. 87 the sponsorship of at least one
defined benefit plan. All subsidiaries reporting separately are excluded. For 1987, some
plan sponsors may still not have adopted FAS No. 87.
Note: In each year, the number of corporate sponsors with underfunded and overfunded
plans combined exceeds the number of sponsors of plans with all funded statuses because
some sponsors have both underfunded and overfunded plans.
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TABLE 2

Ratio of Assets to Accumulated Benefit Obligation (Funded
Ratio of ABO) of DB Plans Sponsored by Corporations

Year

All Plans

Underfunded

Oveifunded

1.13
1.23
1.29
1.27
1.36
1.38
1.47

.73
.71
.71
.72
.68
.70
.71

1.34
1.43
1.51
1.50
1.61
1.62
1.73

1.13
1.22
1.28
1.26
1.40
1.37
1.39

.69
.71
.69
.71
.78
.78
.73

1.28
1.35
1.40
1.40
1.54
1.52
1.51

Simple Averages

1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
Weighted Averages

1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
Source: See Table 1.

may be explained by the dramatic fall in market interest rates in 1993.
An additional possible explanation may be the spotlight shown during
1993 by the SEC on corporate compliance with the requirement to compute benefit obligation with an FAS No. 87-mandated discount rate. Also
there are plans hovering around funded ratios of 100 percent flipping
between underfunded and overfunded status; this fact explains some of
the year-to-year volatility in the statistics.
Table 2 shows the funded status of plans sponsored by these corporations, measured by the "funded ratio (ABO)," that is, the market value
of plan assets divided by the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO). The
ABO is closely related to the OBRA current liability, although different
actuarial assumptions are sometimes used for each. Simple averages of
funded ratios are shown in the upper panel of Table 2, while weighted
averages are shown in the lower panel. By definition, the funded status
of plans with larger ABOs are given more prominence in the lower
panel.
The simple average of the funded ratio of all plans declined from 1.47
in 1987 to 1.13 in 1993. Among underfunded plans, the funded ratio
remained quite steady over the period, at around .71, while among overfunded plans, the funded ratio declined significantly from 1.73 in 1987
to 1.34 in 1993.
The weighted averages of the funded ratio also showed declines, al-
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though at different levels and with different patterns. The weightedaverage funded ratio for all plans declined from 1.39 in 1987 to 1.13 in
1993. Among underfunded plans, the funded ratio declined somewhat
over the period, from .73 to .69; the ratio, however, rose to .78 in 1988
and 1989 before declining to .71 in 1990, following the general pattern
of stock market returns experienced in those years. In Among overfunded plans, the funded ratio declined from 1.51 to 1.28. The differences between simple and weighted averages in level and pattern can be
explained by larger plans generally having lower funded ratios and a
higher proportion of assets in equities.
The period of examination here-1987 to 1993-coincides with the
period just prior to and following the implementation of OBRA. As explained more fully above, the pension provisions of OBRA were intended to enhance the funding status of underfunded plans and to trim
the funded status of overfunded plans to no more than 150 percent of
current liability. Apparently, the law change was very successful in accomplishing the latter, while it failed in the former. (More evidence of the
failure of OBRA to improve funding in underfunded plans is given below.) At the beginning of 1993, plan sponsors were limited to fund up to
150 percent of current liability, computed using an interest rate no lower
than 7.27 percent at a time when all interest rates were declining rapidly
and group annuity contracts were yielding around 6Y2 percent?O
The top panel of Table 3 shows the dollar amount of the unfunded
liability (ABO less assets) reported for all underfunded plans. Over the
period, the unfunded liability increased by US $44 billion, from US $16.6
billion in 1987 to US $60.4 billion in 1993. The increase is, in part, explained by a rapid deterioration in the funding status of the General
Motors hourly plan indicated on GM's public financial statements (US
$22.2 billion in unfunded liability in 1992). By mathematical identity,
because the overall weighted-average funded ratio declined only somewhat, while the amount of unfunded liability more than tripled over the
period, the aggregate ABO for underfunded plans must also have more
than tripled. This is the case; the ABO for underfunded plans increased
from US $61.8 billion in 1987 to US $193.7 billion in 1993.
The lower panel of Table 3 shows the unfunded accrued and prepaid
pension cost for underfunded and overfunded plans, respectively. As explained above, an unfunded accrued pension cost is recognized in the
financial statements of the plan sponsor if the net periodic pension cost
(expense) exceeded amounts the employer had contributed to the plan
since implementation ofFAS No. 87. By 1992, sponsors of underfunded
plans had contributed US $33 billion less than what generally accepted
accounting principles deemed a reasonable rate of pension expense accrual. This can be mostly attributed to the fact that the Internal Revenue
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TABLE 3 Corporate Defined Benefit Pension Obligations and Costs
overTime
Unfunded Accumulated Benefit
Obligation of Corparations
(US$M)
Undeifunded
Plans

1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987

$60,397.7
39,6]5.3
33,902.5
32,997.0
20,768.4
20,205.2
16,589.5

Prepaid (Unfunded Accrued) Pension Cost of Corpomtions
(US$M)
Year

With Underfunded
Plans

With Oveifunded
Plans

1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987

($28,269.1 )
(33,276.2)
(29,976.5)
(26,648.9)
(17,425.9)
(11,902.3)
(11,006.7)

$42,747.1
33,353.5
27,859.7
27,002.2
17,591.8
11,989.6
6,226.1

Source: See Table I.

Code allows a thirty-year amortization of the cost of amendments increasing benefits. In contrast, FAS o. 87 requires amortization over the
future period of service of each active employee or over the average remaining service period of employees expected to receive benefits under
the plan-generally less than 15 years for mature plans. It is also possible
that some plan sponsors used a lower interest rate for FAS No. 87 than
for funding purposes; a lower interest rate increases the relevant pension
expense amounts. The decline in 1993 in the net aggregate unfunded
accrued pension cost may be attributed to the sudden (and probably
temporary) movement of many plans with prepaid pension cost into the
underfunded plan category.
By 1993, sponsors of overfunded plans had contributed about US
$43 billion more than they had recognized as pension expense in their
financial statements. This is probably mostly explained by plans substantially overfunded in 1986 recognizing large credits owing to the amorti-
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4 Ratio of Assets to Projected Benefit Obligations
(Funded Ratio [PBO]) of DB Plans Sponsored by Corporations
(Weighted Averages)
Weighted Average

Yea!'

All Plans

Unde1unded

Overfunded

1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987

.99
1.05
1.09
1.06
1.18
1.14
1.16

.63
.65
.63
.64
.73
.73
.66

1.10
1.14
1.18
1.16
1.27
1.24
1.24

Source: See Table 1.

zation of the net transition obligation. It also may be due either to plan
sponsors using Internal Revenue Code provisions allowing amortization
of the cost of amendments increasing benefits as rapidly as over ten
years, or to using higher interest rates or lower rates of future salary increases for FAS No. 87 than for funding purposes.
Table 4 shows the weighted-average funded ratio calculated using the
projected benefit obligation (PBO) as the denominator. For final-pay
and career-average plans, the PBO exceeds the ABO because the former
concept includes a projection for the effect of future salary increases.
The funded ratio (PBO) is therefore uniformly lower than the funded
ratio (ABO). This, however, is less notable for underfunded plans, which
are more likely to be flat benefit plans and therefore do not usually require salary projections under FAS No. 87. Overall, in 1993, plans had
assets just below the projected benefit obligation.
Results from more recent financial statements were not available at
the time of the writing of this chapter. Market conditions in 1994, however, indicate that the funded status of plans improved. As Bader and Ma
(1995) calculate, the discount rate soared 130 basis points over 1994, and
pension liabilities therefore would plummet. Even the poor investment
returns of most pension funds generated large gains relative to their falling liabilities, strengthening their funded ratios. They estimate that the
funded ratio of a typical plan rose by 9.1 percent during 1994.

Schedule B Data Base (1990)
Form 5500 series returns for all DB plans are required to be filed with an
accompanying Schedule B under the mandate of ERISA. For better comparison with financial accounting data, however, only DB plans with
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more than 100 participants for the 1990 plan year were included in the
analysis of this section of the chapter. There were about 19,400 such
plans, of which 18,300 were single-employer and 1,100 were multiemployer plans. More than four-fifths of the plans were overfunded. This
1990 Schedule B database includes plans with over 39 million participants. Compared to earlier years, a higher portion of the participants in
1990 were non-active, a reflection of the continued aging of participants
in the defined benefit plan system.
Statistics on funded ratios and unfunded liability from the database
are shown in Table 5. The funded ratio and unfunded liability are calculated using the market value of plan assets and current liability, as reported on line six of the Schedule B. For all plans, the funded ratios in
1990 were 1.39 (simple average) and 1.35 (weighted average). For underfunded plans, the funded ratios (simple averages) were .77 for singleemployer plans and .84 for multi employer plans. For overfunded plans,
the funded ratios were 1.56 for single-employer plans and 1.29 for
multiemployer plans. 2J The unfunded liability (in aggregate) was US
$30.3 billion.
One can compare the (beginning-of-plan-year) 1990 numbers on a
(single-employer) plan basis from the Schedule B data base (Table 5) to
the (end-of-fiscal-year) 1989 numbers on a sponsor basis from the FAS
No. 87 data base (Tables 2 and 3). The funded ratios (weighted average)
for underfunded and overfunded plans are approximately the same, and
the unfunded ABO on a sponsor basis (US $20.8 billion) is not much
lower than the unfunded liability on a plan basis (US $23 billion). It is
unlikely that actuarial assumptions differ much between the two data
sources. Any remaining differences can probably be explained by the

TABLE 5 Funded Ratios by Entity Type and Funded Status, 1990
Funded Ratio
Plan Type

All plans
Single employer
Underfunded
Overfunded
Multiemployer
Underfunded
Overfundedd

Simple
Average (%)

Weighted
Average (%)

Unfunded
Liamlity
(US$M)

1.39

1.35

30,303

.77
1.56

.75
1.52

23,094
0

.84
1.29

.86
1.23

7,209
0

See text. 1990 Form 5500/Schedule B returns filed with the IRS oIDB plans with
more than 100 participants.

SOUTce:

Mark J. Warshawsky

--

TABLE

129

6 Distribution of DB Plans by Actuarial Cost Method Number of Plans
Plan Cost Method (# ofplans)
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

Missing

46 4379 6632 1665 4483 11 2097 99
All Plans
Single Employer Underfunded 6 674 1746 120 746 2 282 21
23 2902 4753 1512 3611 9 1806 67
Single Employer Overfunded
8 167
5 5
Multiemployer Underfunded
52
35 0
6
4 6
9 636
Multiemployer Overfunded
81
91 0
27
Source: See Table 5.
Note: Key to actuarial cost methods: A = Attained age normal; B = Entry age normal; C = Accrued
benefit (unit credit); D = Aggregate; E = Frozen initial liability; F = Individual level premium;
G = Other.

fact that the Schedule B database represents more plans than the FAS 87
database.
The distribution of plans by actuarial cost method is shown in Table 6.
The "other" actuarial cost method usually denotes the projected unit
credit method. The three most popular cost methods are unit credit (traditional and projected), frozen initial liability, and entry age normal.
Compared to earlier years, more plans are using unit credit methods
(see Applebaum 1992). This may reflect a desire to match pension accounting expense more closely with contributions or may owe to the
introduction of tighter funding limits. Underfunded plans are more
likely to use unit credit and less likely to use the aggregate method than
overfunded plans. Multiemployer plans, whether underfunded or overfunded, prefer the entry age normal method.

IRS Underfunding Study Sample (1990)
In 1993 and 1994, a random sample of 360 underfunded plans underwent comprehensive examinations for the 1990 plan year conducted by
IRS Employee Plans revenue agents and field actuaries as part of an
Underfunding Study by the Office of Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations of the IRS. Single-employer and
multi-employer plans with at least 100 participants were included in the
sample. As part of the study, the complete Schedule B for each of the
360 examined plans was carefully transcribed in the National Office; in
the (universe) Schedule B database described above, transcription of
only certain items was done by the IRS Service Centers. Some information on the study plans is presented here.
There were over 1.5 million participants in the examined plans, and
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over US $30 billion in asset holdings. The overall funded ratio (weighted
average) was 80 percent and the unfunded liability was US $7.6 billion
for these plans. The examined plans can be described as aging-there
were only 1.3 active workers for every non-active participant-and expected benefit payments far exceeded the increase in liability owing to
the accrual of new benefits. Although employers contributed US $1 billion to the plans, the aggregate credit balance declined by US $400 million over the 1990 plan year. The decline would have been greater but
for significant actuarial gains. The additional funding charge (discussed
in more detail below) made only a drop in the bucket-US $15 million
more in charges to the funding standard account.
The distribution of funded ratios of underfunded plans examined for
the study (not shown) is now described. More than one-third of the plans
approach fully comfortable levels of funding, with funded ratios in excess of 90 percent. In contrast, about one-seventh of the plans were
rather poorly funded (funded ratios below 60 percent), with a few plans
containing almost no assets. Thirteen plans held assets (of any type) at a
level less than three times expected annual benefit payments.
Plans in the study employed a panoply of mortality tables, with a tendency toward tables based on mortality experience of, or projected
through, the 1960s and 1970s. The average assumed retirement age was
63.6, and many plans assumed 65. Most studies of retirement show that
a majority of plan participants retire on or before the earliest age for
receipt of Social Security benefits, 62. Hence, the mortality and retirement age assumptions for these examined plans can best be described
as liberal. The assumed interest rates "for all other calculated values"
(used in calculating normal cost and accrued liability), by contrast,
tended to be conservative (averaging 8.2 percent), particularly when
viewed in comparison to the experience of the 1980s and reasonable expectations in the 1990 plan year. In fact, a majority of the plans assumed
an interest rate of 8 percent or less for all other calculated values.
The interest rate used in current liability calculations averaged 8.5 percent for the sample of plans examined for the study. The actual interest
rates used by plans to calculate current liability were cross-tabbed against
the highest interest rate allowed for a plan with its year beginning in a
certain month. Because most plans use calendar years, the highest rate
allowed for calculating current liability for the 1990 valuation for most
plans was 9.42 percent. About 10 percent of the underfunded plans examined chose the highest allowable interest rate. Most plans, however,
chose a rate lying somewhere between 8 and 9 percent-generally the
rate identical to the one these plans assumed for calculations in the funding standard account.
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7 Extent and Characteristics of Underfunded Plans with Additional Funding
Charges as Required Under OBRA

~-----"'----'----------------------

Plan Creation
Date

Actuarial Cost
Method

Funded Ratio
(Current Liability)

Nllmber ofPlans

Total

After
1980

Before
1980

Aggregate

Other

~90%

<90%

(1) With Actual Addi-

111

41

70

5

106

29

82

301

98

203

6

295

60

241

36.9%

41.8%

34.5%

83.3%

35.9%

48.3%

34%

tional Fundmg
Charge
(2) Indicated Potentially Subject to
Additional Funding
Charge
Percent [(1) -;- (2)]

Source: See text. IRS Underfunding Study for the 1990 plan year. 360 randomly selected underfWlded single-employer and multiemployer plans with at least 100 participants were included in
this sample.

The calculation of the additional funding charge is now analyzed in
more detail. Of the 360 plans, 59 did not do the calculation. Most of
these 59 plans are multiemployer plans-explicitly exempted by the
Internal Revenue Code from the additional funding requirement in
section 4l2(1)-but others incorrectly skipped the calculation. The calculated deficit reduction contribution was large-nearly US $1 billionbut the offsets reported were even larger. Hence, the additional funding
charge was quite small. Further information about additional contributions is shown in Table 7.Justmore than one-third of the plans made any
additional con tribution; plans with more recent creation dates, using the
aggregate cost method and with higher funded ratios, were more likely
to be required to have an additional funding charge.

Some Speculation About Future Trends in Funding
The first issues in evaluating the impact of the new minimum funding
requirements on future trends in funding are identifying the class of
plans potentially affected by the new rules and calculating the average
funded ratio. In particular, which plans will be less than 90 percent
funded in 1995 and beyond when their current liability is calculated with
an interest rate at the top of the permissible corridor and the 1983 GAM
mortality table? What will be their funded ratio?
For those plans with a plan year beginning in January 1995, the mandated value of the current liability interest rate is 109 percent of 7.27,
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that is, 7.93 percent. Only 10 percent of plans in the 1990 plan year were
at the top of the interest rate corridor (9.42 percent). The average current liability interest rate was 8.5 percent at a time when corporate bonds
were yielding about 9 percent. That is, the average rate used for current
liability was about 50 basis points below the prevailing corporate bond
yield. It is therefore likely that most plans will not have to move down
much from the in terest rates chosen from a corridor of 6.68 to 8.17 percent for their 1994 calculations of current liability, at a time when corporate bonds were yielding 7 percent, to meet the requirement of 7.93
percent for 1995, when bonds were yielding 8Y2 percent.
The requirement to use the 1983 GAM mortality table is probably
more significant. A majority of underfunded plans in 1990 used the 1971
GAM or 1984 Unisex Pension tables, based on mortality experience of
the 1970s. At 8 percent, an immediate annuity for a male age 62 is about
5 percent less if calculated using the 1984 Unisex Pension table rather
than the 1983 GAM table. Hence, conversion to the required 1983 GAM
table is likely to cause a general, but modest, increase in current liability
and therefore a modest decline in funded ratios. The decline in funded
ratios coming from both mandated changes in interest rates and mortality table, however, is unlikely to be more than 10 percent.
In summary, the plans potentially affected by RPA (those less than
90 percent funded with mandated actuarial assumptions) are generally
the same plans that were subject to the OBRA minimum funding requirements (those less than 100 percent funded). Assuming that these
are also the same plans indicated by the FAS No. 87 database as being
underfunded in 1993 (see Table 2) and that the same assumptions were
used for current liability and FAS No. 87 purposes, the average funded
ratio in 1995 of plans to which the new rules will apply is probably
around 65 percent.
The next issue in evaluating the impact of the new minimum funding
rules is the effect of the strengthened rules relating to the additional
funding charge. In the near term, it is difficult to predict the net impact
because of the complexity of the various transition rules and the uncertainty of plan sponsor elections. In the long run, however, average
funded ratios will inevitably rise above 80 percent owing to the faster
amortizations of the amounts of underfunding outstanding or newly created for most plans with funded ratios below 90 percent. Whether the
dollar amount of underfunding will be much reduced in the long run
depends on whether the improvements in funded ratios occur faster
than the increases in liability owing to periodic plan amendments.
There were only minor changes in RPA affecting the funding rules for
overfunded plans. There is some evidence that the decline in funded
ratios of these plans should soon stop and then level off, probably at
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around an average of 120 percent. According to the FAS No. 87 database,
in 1987 over 56 percent of the companies with overfunded plans had
funded ratios in excess of 150 percent. By 1993, however, the proportion
of these "excess funded" plans had dropped to 21 percent. Because
there are no incentives and some potential penalties to being excess
funded and because, if they are able, plan sponsors will generally try to
avoid having underfunded plans to avoid the higher PBCC premiums
and the complex web of funding and other rules applying to underfunded plans under RPA, sponsors of overfunded plans probably have a
target funded ratio of 120 or 125 percent.

A Funding Reform Proposal
A proposal to reform the minimum funding requirements and maximum contribution limits is now outlined. Each element of the proposal
will be described briefly, along with a short justification. The proposal
applies only to single-employer plans because concerns about complexity and PBCC financial exposure are concentrated there.

Eliminate the Special Funding Rules for Underfunded Plans
The current rules applying to underfunded plans with more than 100
participants (additional funding charge and solvency requirement) are
extremely complex and therefore administratively burdensome and
costly, particularly for small and medium-size plans. In addition, extra
volatility is introduced in required funding, as changes in asset values
may move plans among various funded statuses, and therefore different
funding requirement regimes, over short time periods. The solvency requirement, while applying to all underfunded plans, will actually cause
very few plans to increase their funding. The current funding rules create the requirement to fund unfunded past service liabilities over short
time periods, tllereby increasing the cost of starting a DB plan. When the
suspicion, lack of understanding of sometimes complex provisions, and
general dislike of many workers (especially young mobile ones) is also
factored into the new plan sponsor's decision calculus, it is no wonder
that relatively few DB plans are created nowadays. Concerns about plans
with endemic underfunding can be addressed more simply, as proposed
below.

Eliminate the Current Liability Full Funding Limitation
As explained in the section on OBRA, this limitation introduces extra
volatility to funding patterns and discriminates against plans with young
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workforces expecting large wage increases. The full funding limitation
would be based on accrued liability, as under original ERISA. Concerns
about excess funding and the loss of federal tax revenues can be addressed more simply, as proposed below.

Change (Generally Shorten) the Amortization Period for the
Creation of New Plan Liabilities
As under FAS No. 87, the amortization period for the creation of new
plan liabilities, either for past service for a newly created plan or owing
to plan amendments increasing benefits, should be the expected future
period of service of active plan participants. Thus, the amortization period will be long for young workforces and short for older workforces. In
nearly all conceivable cases, however, it will be shorter than the currently
allowed 3O-year period. This change should reduce future underfunding, particularly among flat benefit plans that continually increase benefits to keep pace with wage inflation.

Restrict the Actuarial Cost Method to Be (projected) Unit Credit
As under FAS No. 87, the only allowed cost methods should be the traditional unit credit method for flat benefit plans and the projected unit
credit method for compensation-related benefit plans. This restriction
will eliminate the technique of changing actuarial cost metilOds to influence the pattern of funding. Compared to other cost methods, use of the
unit credit method generally reduces the level of funding in newly created plans and increases funding in older plans. In most instances, this
restriction will also create economies in actuarial work, and perhaps
eliminate the need for separate actuarial valuations for financial accounting and ERISA purposes. Any increase in accrued liability resulting
from the mandated change in cost method should be amortized over no
less than 15 years.

Amortize the Existing Unfunded Accrued Liability over 15 Years
Similar to some of the funding options available under RPA and the requirement of FAS No. 87 at the time of adoption of the new accounting
standard, underfunding in existence at the time of adoption of the reform proposal should eventually be eliminated. A simple fifteen-year
amortization period would not increase funding requirements for most
underfunded plans too much.
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umit the Choice of Actuarial Assumptions
In order to control the outlay of federal tax revenues, as well to reduce
underfunding, the ability to "game" the calculation of the accrued liability should be limited. In addition to the current restrictions on interest
rate and mortality assumptions, legislative restrictions on the choice of
other actuarial assumptions (particularly, the retirement age) should be
imposed, or the ability of the IRS to police the choice of assumptions
should be enhanced.

conclusions
This chapter shows that the funded ratios of underfunded plans declined slightly and the amount of underfunding increased greatly over
the 1987 to 1993 period, despite the intent of minimum funding requirements imposed by OBRA. The funded ratios of overfunded plans declined significantly over the same period, probably owing to the impact
of a new full funding limitation. Changes in the minimum funding requirements in 1994 should cause an increase in funded ratios for
underfunded plans over the long run. If the current regime of funding
requirements can be simplified, this would contribute to an even greater
reduction in underfunding.
Opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not
necessarily those ofTIAA-CREF or of his former employer, the IRS. The
author was senior economist with the Employee Plans Division of the IRS
when he wrote the bulk of this chapter; he thanks the actuaries there,
particularly Kathryn Marticello, for their comments and assistance. Lawrence Bader and Professor H. Fred Mittelstaedt also provided helpful
comments.
Notes
1. In computing funding requirements and for certain reporting purposes,
actuaries are allowed to use either the market value of assets or an "actuarial
value" of assets. Actuarial asset valuation methods are used to smooth fluctuations in investment performance, by recognizing such fluctuations in a more
gradual manner. The regulations originally required that allowable asset valuation methods must be applied on a consistent basis, take into account fair market
value, and lie within a corridor of a minimum and a maximum of either market
or average value. Guaranteed investment contracts issued by life insurance companies, however, are allowed to be carried at book value.
2. ERISA originally provided multiemployer plans longer amortization periods over which to amortize the initial unfunded liability and changes in liability
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due to plan amendments (40 years) and experience gains and losses (20 years).
The differen t amortization periods for multiemployer plans were removed by the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPA), except for liabilities created before enactment of MPPA.
3. Prior to 1995, the IRS gave automatic approval to most changes in funding
methods if done no more frequently than once every three years.
4. Yet another choice within some funding methods is whether normal cost
is computed separately for each active employee and then summed together (individual basis) or calculated for the plan as a whole (aggregate basis). Although
hardly utilized, ERISA also allows plans using the entry age normal cost method
to elect to employ an alternative minimum funding standard. In particular, alternative funding standard account (ASA) charges are the sum of (1) normal cost
(the lesser of those computed under the entry age normal or unit credit methods), (2) the excess, if any, of the present value of accrued benefits over the market value of assets, and (3) the excess, if any, of credits over charges to the ASA
for all prior years. Also, for some collectively bargained plans, the shortfall
method is allowed. This method allows contributions at a rate, expressed as cents
per hour worked or dollars per units produced, estimated by an actuary as able to
satisry the minimum funding requirements.
5. The value of any "unpredictable contingent event benefits," such as plant
closing benefits, however, are not included in current liability until the contingent event actually occurs.
6. For non-multiemployer plans, OBRA eliminated the minimum and maximum corridor for permitted actuarial value of assets around an average value of
assets; only the corridor around market value remains.
7. Failure to make the required quarterly contribution results in an additional interest charge in the funding standard account on the unpaid amount
and in excise taxes if still not paid 8-1/2 months after the end of the plan year.
Liens are imposed when unpaid required installments exceed US $1,000,000 and
are not made within specified time periods.
8. The waiver must now be based on temporary substantial business hardship,
each member of the sponsor's controlled group must experience hardship, the
PBGC must be consulted on large waivers and security may be required, and plan
participants must be notified of the initial request.
9. This table will remain in effect at least until the 2000 plan year and until
the Secretary of Treasury issues a new mortality table based on the actual experience of pension plans and projected trends. Plans are permitted to use special
mortality tables for disabled participants. Certain large underfunded plans cannot change other actuarial assumptions, such as retirement age and turnover
rates, to cause a substantial decrease in the current liability unless the new assumptions are approved by the Secretary of Treasury.
10. Moreover, for large non-multi-employer underfunded plans, the heretofore largely dormant requirement under Code Section 401 (a) (29) to post security upon adoption of a plan amendment increasing the current liability may
become more relevant as current liabilities are increased by the mandated
change in interest rate and mortality table.
11. The transition tests are met (under the law then in effect) if (1) the plan
did not have an additional funding charge (or would not have had such a charge
if the plan had used the highest allowable interest rate and did not reduce assets
by the credit balance), (2) the plan's full funding limit was zero, or (3) the addi-
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tional funding charge did not exceed the lesser of 0.5 percent of current liability
or US $5 million.
12. The target funding ratio is calculated by increasing the initial funding ratio
(as of the beginning of the 1995 plan year) by a fixed number of percentage
points each year. If the initial ratio is less than 75 percent, the target percentage
is increased by three percentage points per year for plan years 1995 through
1999, four percentage points for 2000, and five percentage points for 2001. lithe
initial ratio is greater than 75 percent, the annual increments in the target percentage are somewhat smaller. The operation of this limit is independent of the
limits tied to the permissible amortizations of old unfunded current liability desc6bed above.
13. Other changes directly relevant to funding made by the RPA include the
repeal of the interest charge on quarterly contributions for plans funded in excess of current liability, an adjustment to the full funding limit to conform to the
new minimum funding requirements, and relief from excise taxes on certain
types of nondeductible cont6butions.
14. Past service cost is the unfunded initial accrued liability created when a
new plan credits employees for service rendered before the initiation of the plan.
Prior service cost is the addition to the accrued liability created when plan
amendments increase benefits owing to service rendered prior to the effective
dates of the amendments.
15. Terminal accounting refers to waiting until the participant is entitled to
receive a benefit at retirement or termination before recognizing the expense.
16. The minimum charge to expense was the sum of (1) the normal cost,
(2) interest on any unfunded past and prior service costs, and (3) for underfunded plans witl) a declining funding status, the lesser of (a) the amount of
needed to bring about a 5 percent reduction in the unfunded vested benefit
obligation or (b) the amount needed to amortize the unfunded past and prior
service cost over 40 years. The maximum charge was the sum of (l) the normal
cost, and (2) 10 percent amortization of any initial past service cost and any prior
service cost arising from plan amendments (until fully amortized).
17. In the amortization, it is permitted to recognize only the gain or loss exceeding 10 percent of the greater of the projected benefit obligation or the
market-related value of assets. In FAS No. 110, issued in 1992, the FASB revoked the former permission to value guaranteed investment contracts at contract value.
18. The additional liability generally may be offset in the balance sheet by an
intangible asset rather than a reduction in equity.
19. One might challenge the explanation that the higher weighted-average
funded ratios for underfunded plans in 1988 and 1989 were caused by financial
market conditions by citing the decline in funded ratio in 1991 despite the strong
stock market returns experienced that year. As will be noted below, however, the
accumulation by 1991 of a very large unfunded liability by the General Motors
hourly plan overwhelms the general pattern.
20. The decline in the funded ratio for overfunded plans in 1987 and 1988
can perhaps also be explained by continuing reversion activities.
21. Allhough employer securities and property are less helpful to benefit security than other assets, excluding employer securities and property from plan
assets would change funded ratios very little in 1990 because, at US $4.2 billion,
employer securities and property represent a small portion of total net assets.
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